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Let’s See You Do Better 
 
 
Let me begin this paper with some puzzling data.  In response to criticism, many people often 
say, in these or similar words, “Let’s see you do better!” Consider the following cases:  
  
The dragon.  Lucy and Dan (both teenagers) are in art class; the assignment is to draw a 
dragon.  Dan enters class slightly late, and is preparing to begin drawing.  Before doing 
so, he catches a sideways glance at Lucy’s (admittedly shambolic) dragon; he says to 
Lucy, snidely, “Nice dragon Lucy!” Lucy responds: “Alright Dan, let’s see you do 
better!” 
 
The baseball players.  Taylor and Chase are teammates on the baseball team.  Taylor 
strikes out, and badly so.  As he is returning to the dugout, Chase shouts at him, 
“Come on man, hit the stupid ball!” Taylor says, “Alright Chase, let’s see you do 
better!”  
 
The gardeners.  John and Jane are fellow friends and gardeners.  John is visiting Jane 
when he notices that her orchids have wilted and died.  Grinning sarcastically, John 
says “Looking after these orchids well I see!”  Jane says, “Hey, I’d like to see you keep 
orchids alive!”  
 
The graduate students.  Andrew and Marcus are friends and history PhD students, and 
Andrew has recently started submitting some of his work for potential publication, but 
unfortunately keeps getting rejected.  Marcus – who is a year behind Andrew in the 
program – says, with just a small discernible hint of schadenfreude, “Another rejection, 
eh Andrew?”  Andrew replies, “Yeah, well, let me know when you get your first 
acceptance, wise guy.”   
 
The house painter.  Rebecca is undertaking some do-it-yourself house renovations, and is 
struggling to even out a coat of plaster.  Her father Ross, an electrical engineer, stands 
by chirping various corrections and criticisms: “Not so much on the plate just there, 
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love”, “Spread it a bit more evenly now,” and so on.  Tiring of Ross’ complaining, 
Rebecca says, “Alright Dad, let’s see you do it better!”  
 
At this point, you get the idea.  As a first approximation, the data here is twofold: (a) we very 
often say such things, and (b) there is a feeling that if the critic does do better – for example, if 
Dan draws an impeccable dragon – then the criticism stands, whereas if the critic doesn’t, that 
criticism must be retracted.  Prima facie, then, it looks like the response, “Let’s see you do 
better,” is a challenge of a certain kind – a challenge to prove that one has what has recently 
been called standing.  As a first approximation, the thought here seems to be this: the critic can 
properly cricitize (with respect to some standard) only if the critic is better than the criticized 
(with respect to that standard).  More generally, the data here seems to point a certain kind of 
norm of criticism: be better.  Slightly more carefully:  
 
 The be better norm of criticism: 
 
One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one is better than x with 
respect to standard s.   
 
In this paper, I defend precisely this norm of criticism.   
But let me back up. There has been an explosion of interest in recent moral philosophy 
in the notion of the moral standing to blame.  The central phenomena at stake in this literature is 
the following: just because a given wrongdoer is in fact blameworthy for a given wrong, it 
doesn’t follow that just anyone is in moral position to blame her for that wrong.  More 
particularly, the thought is that some blamers are not “in position” to blame, irrespective of the 
fact that the content of their blame may be true (and thus in that respect “fitting”).  
Philosophers writing under the guise of the “moral standing to blame” have articulated at least 
four conditions on having “moral standing,” but the central condition that unifies all such 
treatments is what we might call the non-hypocrisy condition.  As a first approximation, 
according to this condition, one has standing to blame a morally responsible wrongdoer only if 
– again, as a first approximation – one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize.  
Precisely how best to motivate and articulate a non-hypocrisy norm on standing to blame is a 
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complicated affair.  But the following is uncontroversial: if there is a standing norm on blame 
at all, then there is some appropriate non-hypocrisy condition on the standing to blame.1   
 But now the point.  I do not have a theory of blame.  However, I do claim the 
following.  In none of the cases described above – the dragon, the baseball players, the students, the 
gardeners, the house painter – does the critic morally blame the criticized.  In other words, it is 
intuitively obvious that the cases described above do not involve moral blame.  In the sense of 
“blame” at issue in the literature on moral standing, it is a minimally necessary condition on 
“blame” that the blamer thinks that the blamee has acted immorally – that is, has violated some 
moral expectation.  But consider.  When Dan criticizes Lucy’s dragon, is this because Dan 
thinks that Lucy has acted immorally in producing such a dragon?  Does Dan believe – 
implicitly or otherwise – that Lucy has done something wrong in producing such a dragon?  Of 
course not.  Dan does not blame Lucy for her dragon; that would be absurd (not to mention 
unjust).  And yet Dan has certainly criticized Lucy’s dragon – and thus, in some sense, Dan has 
criticized Lucy herself.  (Dan criticizes Lucy by criticizing her dragon.) So similarly in the other 
cases: there is no moral wrongdoing (no moral failings) even in the vicinity of these examples.  
And yet, in these examples, a standing norm is still in place.   
Thus, considerations concerning the positionality of critics – of who is in position to 
criticize – are seemingly more general than considerations concerning the positionality of 
blamers.  In short, all blame is criticism, but not all criticism is blame – and concerns about the 
“standing” of critics apply more widely than merely to blamers. But now we face a series of 
difficult questions.  What, exactly, is the relevant norm pertaining to criticism more generally?  
And how does that norm relate to the non-hypocrisy norm on the standing to blame?  These 
are the questions I address in this paper.  I defend the be better norm of criticism, and I defend 
the thesis that the non-hypocrisy condition on standing to blame can plausibly be derived from 
this more general norm on criticism per se.  The be better norm, however, faces a series of 
                                               
1 Early reflections (relatively speaking, of course) on standing can be found in Wertheimer 1998 and 
Dworkin 2000.  When the proper explosion began is slightly hard to determine, but Cohen 2006 seems 
a good place to locate it.  For further reflections on the “positionality” of blamers, see, e.g., Tadros 
2009, Duff 2010, Wallace 2010, Russell 2010, Radzik  2011, Todd 2012 and 2018 and 2019, Lippert-
Rasmussen 2013, Friedman 2013, King 2015 and 2020, McKiernan 2016, Herstein 2017 and 2020, 
Rivera López 2017, Isserow and Klein 2017,  Coates and Tognazzini 2018, McKenna 2018, Fritz and 
Miller 2018 and 2019, Rossi 2018, Roadevin 2018, Fritz 2019, Riedener 2019, Matheson 2019, Beade 
2019, Edwards 2019, Seim 2019, Tierney and Telech 2019, Cornell and Sepinwall 2020, and Piovarchy 
forthcoming a [https://philpapers.org/rec/PIOHST] and forthcoming b 
[https://philpapers.org/rec/PIOSSH].  
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difficult objections.  After laying out the conceptual options concerning the issues of this 
paper, I defend the be better norm from these objections, and turn finally to the crucial project 
of deriving the non-hypocrisy condition on blame from the be better norm in question.   The 
end result is that though the be better norm stands, we must concede that it is nevertheless 




I begin by briefly describing the four different options we must consider concerning the topics 
of this paper: 
 
(1) There is no standing norm on criticism per se, and no standing norm on blame. 
 
(2) There is no standing norm on criticism per se, but there is a standing norm on 
blame. 
 
(3) There is a standing norm on criticism per se, and there is a standing norm on blame, 
but the former does not ground the latter. 
 
(4) There is a standing norm on criticism per se, and there is a standing norm on blame, 
because the former grounds the latter.   
 
In this paper, I defend option (4).  But why not (1), (2), or (3)?  I take these options in turn.  
 Option (1) is the view of someone we might call the resolute standing skeptic.  According 
to this kind of skeptic, there is not even a genuine standing norm on blame.  Now, anyone who 
thinks that there is no standing norm on blame is unlikely to think that nevertheless there is a 
standing norm on non-moral criticism.  My goal in this paper, however, is not to argue against 
the resolute standing skeptic.  My goal, instead, is to say that those who take seriously a 
standing norm on blame should also take seriously a standing norm on criticism more 
generally. Accordingly, in this paper, I simply assume that (1) is false.2  
                                               
2 For what I take to be defences of option (1), however, see Bell 2013, and Dover 2019.   
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 Option (2) is, I think, the position that is implicit in much of the recent literature on 
the standing to blame.  Theorists in this vein take seriously a standing norm (or norms) on 
blame, but discuss this norm solely as a norm on blame qua blame – and seemingly never 
connect the standing to blame with the standing to criticize more generally.  Of course, I am 
not aware of theorists defending a standing norm on blame explicitly denying that this norm 
applies to criticism more generally; the point, however, is simply that this connection is never 
made; the literature simply proceeds as if there were no such more general norm.  However, 
since I am assuming that there is a standing norm on blame, my argument against option (2) is 
simply that there is in fact a standing norm on criticism more generally.  In the sections to 
come, building on the cases described above, I articulate and defend just such a norm.  
 The proponent of Option (3), however, agrees with me that there is a standing norm 
on criticism per se, and a standing norm on blame.  However, according to Option (3), these 
norms are conceptually independent, in the sense that the former does not, in any way, ground 
the latter.  Now, the best way to argue against (3) is simply to provide a plausible positive 
account of how the standing norm on criticism (together, perhaps, with other relevant facts) 
does ground a standing norm on blame – and to this project I eventually turn.  However, 
conceptually, it seems that there is strong antecedent reason to regard (3) with suspicion – 
especially once we admit that blame is a type of criticism.  That is, criticism stands to blame as 
genus does to species; again, all blame is criticism, although not all criticism is blame – indeed, 
blaming is a specific way of criticizing, just as being a horse is a specific way of being a mammal. 
(More on criticism shortly.) In this light, consider the following commitment of Option (3):    
 
The standing norm on blame is not grounded in the standing norm on criticism, even 
though (i) there is a standing norm on criticism, and (ii) blame is a type of criticism.   
 
It is perhaps impossible to rule out this contention on conceptual grounds alone – but it seems 
implausible.  More plausibly, if there is a more general norm of criticism, the standing norm on 
blame is in some way grounded in that more general norm.  Thus, philosophers who think that 
the standing norm on blame cannot be grounded in a standing norm on criticism more 
generally are seemingly better off denying that there even is a more general standing norm on 
criticism: “standing” only pertains to blame.  And here we are back to Option (2).   
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 And thus we come to Option (4), the view I wish to defend.  The challenge for Option 
(4) is clear. We must (a) explain and defend the standing norm on criticism, and (b) articulate 
how the standing norm on blame is grounded in the standing norm on criticism.  To the first 
of these projects I now turn.3   
 
Be better: initial observations  
 
Let me begin with the following admission.  At first blush, it can seem that the fact that one’s 
critics can’t do any better themselves is of no independent importance to the appropriateness 
of their criticisms.  (It certainly isn’t relevant to the correctness of their criticisms; but this point 
is agreed on by all hands.)  That is, it can seem that the reply, “Let’s see you do better,” is 
something like a schoolyard defense-mechanism: when you’ve been rightly criticized, simply 
throw up something about one’s critics to deflect the attention on to them rather than you.  
And so let me address the following question.  Why is it that we might rightly care about 
whether the person criticizing us can do any better?  Why is that when we suspect that 
someone can’t do better, we somehow rightly resent their criticism?  Various answers suggest 
themselves; here is just one.  Suppose Lucy and Dan, side by side, have independently just 
drawn dragons of equally poor quality.  Nevertheless, Dan looks at Lucy’s dragon and makes 
fun of it.  What is it that is so irritating about Dan’s criticism (beyond, of course, the intrinsic 
annoyance of being made fun of)?  One suggestion is simple.  Dan’s criticism – unlike the 
criticism of someone else – seems to suggest that he is a fault-finder, and ungenerously disposed 
to be concerned with the wrong things.  Lucy may think: fine, my dragon is admittedly poor – 
but why are you concerned with pointing out the faults in my dragon when the faults in your 
                                               
3 Note: a norm like be better just says who is not prohibited for standing-based reasons from criticizing.  It 
doesn’t say who is all things considered enabled to criticize.  In general, however, I will tend to assume 
that those not prohibited for standing bases reasons from criticizing are not prohibited by any other 
reasons from criticizing, and are therefore enabled to criticize.  A further note: it very well may be that, 
in the cases I describe in this paper, the critics are simply criticizing unnecessarily, or pointlessly, or even 
meanly – and that the critics shouldn’t criticize in the given ways on these grounds alone.  And so let 
me say the following.  I am not saying, in this paper, that one can meanly criticize someone else, so long 
as one can do better than that person.  Instead, I am saying that it is one thing (a bad thing) to criticize 
meanly, and an additional bad thing (albeit of a different kind) to criticize without standing.  To the 
merely mean critic, one can say, “Hey, don’t be mean!” But to the mean critic who also lacks standing, 
one can say, “Hey, don’t be mean – and who are you to be criticizing me anyway; you’re no better!”  
One final note: I am defending be better as a moral norm on criticism, but not as a constitutive 
norm of criticism.  For more on this distinction, see Reiland 2020.  
 7 
own dragon are (or ought to be) equally salient?  Why is it that the faults of my dragon have 
caught your particular attention in this way?4 They would be salient to you, given the faults of 
your own dragon, only if you were particularly interested in finding them – and, we think, being 
particularly interested in finding faults in others is certainly some kind of vice.   
 Before moving on, it is worth noticing that the scenario as described is certainly 
psychologically unrealistic.  In a context in which Lucy and Dan have both publicly drawn 
dragons of exactly the same quality, it is extraordinarily unrealistic to think of Dan now making 
fun of Lucy’s dragon in particular – without any reference to his own.  This would, practically, 
simply be creating a rod for his own back; Lucy would, of course, turn quickly back around on 
Dan, likely in anger, and point out how Dan’s dragon is equally bad.  And it is practically 
senseless (and perhaps pathological) to create a rod for one’s own back, just for the sake of 
creating a rod for someone else’s.  In other words, it is only the pathologically critical who are 
so concerned to see someone else criticized that they would willingly see themselves criticized 
simply so that someone else may be criticized as well.  For Dan’s criticism to make sense, it 
would have to be that he values Lucy’s being criticized more than he disvalues himself being 
criticized.  Most of us, however, would far prefer a situation in which we aren’t criticized at all 
than a situation in which some other given person is criticized, but we are too. 
To bring out the psychological implausibility yet further, consider a standard scenario 
in which a baseball player strikes out, thereby letting the team down. Now, no minimally 
sensible baseball player who has just struck out will easily find within himself the capacity to 
yell at the next player who strikes out; any player with even a modicum of sense will know that 
any such behaviour would invite a monumental backlash.  A star player who never strikes out 
may eventually find himself without friends if he consistently yells at his teammates who do 
strike out – but the average player who just strikes out will find himself without friends that very 
day if he nevertheless yells at his teammates who also strike out.  But then: I contend that it is 
precisely because we accept the be better norm that these scenarios are so unrealistic.  It is not 
uncommon to find a star player that likes to yell at his less talented teammates when they fail; 
it is more or less unheard of to find an average player that likes to yell at his teammates for 
failing in exactly the ways he does.   
Note further that a proper theory of the data at issue in this paper should be consistent 
with the observation that the “let’s see you do better” response can be deployed third-personally – 
                                               
4 Cf. King’s 2020 account of standing in terms of norms of attention. 
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that is, on behalf of someone else.  Some interlocutors have registered their worry that they 
would feel bad – or somehow unvirtuous – if they employed this response to a given criticism.  
There are perhaps various reasons for this feeling, not all of which I can diagonose; I simply 
wish to note that this feeling is less likely to arise in the event that one deploys this response on 
someone else’s behalf.  If Dan makes fun of Lucy’s dragon, then even agents besides Lucy can 
challenge Dan in the relevant way; a bystander who wishes to (in some sense) stick up for Lucy, 
or who otherwise simply thinks (or suspects) that Dan has no right to make the criticism he has 
made, can say to him, “Well, let’s see you do better Dan!”5  
Finally, one note about the title of this paper. Note that, strictly speaking, the reply 
“Let’s see you do better” will only make sense in contexts in which the relevant acts are publicly 
repeatable.  For instance, suppose Chase struck out three times during the last game, which 
Taylor missed due to a family emergency.  Catching up with Chase, Taylor says, “You struck 
out three times?  Come on!” Here it makes little sense for Chase to say, “Well, let’s see you do 
better.”  The game is in the past, and the circumstances of the test – that particular pitcher on 
that particular day – are unrepeatable.  But this doesn’t imply, of course, that the be better norm 
is not in place.  Instead, it shows that if Chase suspects that Taylor could have done no better, 
Chase would have to content himself with the reply, “Yeah, well, trust me – you couldn’t have 
done any better.” And at this stage we simply encounter all the vagaries inherent in the 
judgment that Taylor could have done no better in a situation he never in fact had to face.  
Needless to say, if Taylor insists that he could have done better in that situation, but Chase 
disagrees, there is no decisive way of resolving this dispute.  Once more, however, this doesn’t 
imply that the be better norm isn’t in place; this simply implies that – as with many moral 
norms – it is sometimes difficult (or even impossible) to settle when they have been violated, 
and when they haven’t been.   
 
Objection 1: an epistemic error-theory 
 
At this stage, I want to address one potential competing diagnosis of the cases described at the 
outset of this paper.  One might contend that the reply, “Let’s see you do better,” is not exactly 
a demand that the critic prove that he or she has standing to criticize.  Rather, it is a way of 
indirectly attempting to get the critic to withdraw the criticism by coming to appreciate that the 
                                               
5 I thank (withheld) for helpful discussion about these issues.   
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criticized is not properly objectively criticisable – in particular, it is an attempt to get the critic to 
see that the task at hand is harder than the critic appreciates.  And once the critic appreciates that 
the relevant task is sufficiently difficult, the critic will (or should) come to appreciate that the 
criticism was unfitting, and thus that he or she must retract it.  Fundamentally, then, the “Let’s 
see you do better” reply is not a standing-based reply to a critic, but a criticizability-based reply.  
Consider the parallel distinction in the case of blame.  Certainly one way – perhaps the 
standard way – of rejecting someone’s blame is by contending that what one has done is not 
really blameworthy, whether because it wasn’t wrong, or whether because, even if it was wrong, 
one had some given excuse for doing it.  What is distinctive of a standing-based reply to a 
blamer, however, is that the blamee does not contest (which is not to say concedes) his or her 
blameworthiness6; instead, the blamee’s point is that even if I am blameworthy, you in particular 
are in no position to blame.  In short, according to this objection, at a deeper level of analysis, 
“Let’s see you do better” is a really just a way of saying “What I’ve done here is not objectively 
criticisable.”  
 First a concession.  I concede that “Let’s see you do better” is ambiguous between this 
non-standing-based challenge, and a standing-based challenge.  Consider once more moral 
blame.  As Todd (2019: 359) observes concerning the “non-hypocrisy” condition, sometimes 
we may point to our critics’ past behaviour, not as a way of showing that they lack standing, but 
as a way of (attempting to) undermine their confidence in their judgment that what we’re 
doing is wrong in the first place.  Consider Todd’s case of a teenager who protests to her 
parents, “Well, I know that you went to parties where there was alcohol when you were young.”  
Such a protest is ambiguous between the following: (a) yes, maybe this is wrong, but you are in 
no position to blame me, having done this yourself, and (b) the fact that you did this when you 
were young (and are fine now!) shows that this is a normal thing for people of the relevant age 
to do.  The first protest is standing-based; the second isn’t.  So similarly here.  Challenging our 
critic to perform the relevant task herself may be a way of trying to get that critic to see 
something objective or person-neutral about that task – or, I contend, it may be a way of trying to 
get that critic to see something person-relative about that task, viz., that even if that task is 
objectively not that difficult, anyway the critic is in no position to criticize, because the critic too 
falls below the objective standard in question.   
                                               
6 Cohen 2006: 119.   
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 Suppose Chase is facing a moderately talented pitcher (relative to the level of play at 
issue), and has just struck out.  Taylor is now up to bat facing the same pitcher, and also strikes 
out.  Now consider what would explain the total strangeness, in this context, of Chase’s 
criticizing Taylor for striking out.  Plausibly, nothing “epistemic” can (by itself) explain this 
strangeness – that is, there is nothing that Chase is not aware of that might explain this 
strangeness.  Having just struck out (and, perhaps, having a great deal of relevant experience at 
this level of play), Chase is, indeed, in perfect position to appreciate precisely how difficult it is 
(or isn’t) not to strike out against this pitcher.  In this context, Chase may be in privileged 
position to judge or recognize that Taylor is bad batter, objectively speaking (supposing he is) – 
but what he isn’t in a position to do is to criticize Taylor’s batting, being no better himself.  It is 
this fact that would explain the strangeness of Chase’s nevertheless criticizing Taylor.   
 
Objection 2: Criticizing versus pointing out 
 
This final point – one concerning the distinction between recognizing a fault and criticizing a 
fault – brings us to our next objection. Consider the following dialogue from the 1940 film 
Edison the Man:  
 
Thomas Edison: That spring is too strong. It won’t work. 
 
Workman: I’d like to see you make a better one. 
 
Thomas Edison: Well, a fellow can tell a bad egg without being able to lay one.7 
 
Now, Edison certainly seems to have a point. Thankfully, however, my defense of the be better 
norm of criticism does not commit me to disagreeing with Edison. In particular, I concede that 
the workman’s reply is inappropriate – but this is because it isn’t clear that Edison’s statement 
is a criticism of him and his spring.  If Edison is simply pointing out that, as a matter of fact, the 
workman’s spring is not going to work, it is of course beside the point for the workman to 
reply that he would like to see Edison do better.  Edison is right: a fellow can tell a bad egg 
without being able to lay one; but it doesn’t follow that a fellow can criticize a bad egg without 
                                               
7 As referenced here: https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/LetsSeeYOUDoBetter.   
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being able to lay one.  To bring out the contrast here, consider the following modified 
dialogue:  
 
Thomas Edison: Look, I doubt anyone could do any better, least of all me, so I’m not 
criticizing you; but I should point out, before you go further, that that spring is too 
strong – it isn’t going to work. 
 
#Workman:  Oh really?  Let’s see you do better. 
 
It is patently obvious that if someone tells you “I’m not criticizing you, but I just wanted to 
note that …”, it is inappropriate to respond, “Well then, let’s see you do better.” In other 
words, if someone says to you, “OK, let’s see you do better,” one way to deflect this response 
just is to say that one is not doing the thing subject to the norm now being invoked; one is not 
criticizing.  The very infelicity of the workman’s response in the second dialogue is strong 
evidence that, once more, we accept some kind of be better norm, and suggests that the diagnosis 
concerning the first dialogue is the ambiguity of Edison’s statement.  By saying “It won’t work,” 
Edison could be criticizing the workman, or he could be merely pointing out that what he’s done 
won’t work.   
My defense of the be better norm thus crucially relies on some felt distinction between 
recognizing and advising that someone or something falls below some relevant standard, and 
criticizing that someone or something for falling below that standard. A similar distinction 
arises with respect to blame.  Observe that, in the case of blame, it is often difficult to tell when 
one is being merely advised that something one is doing (or has done) is wrong, and when one is 
being blamed.8  Here I borrow a trenchant observation on this score due to Neal Tognazzini, 
who relates the following anecdote.9  Tognazzini was relaying to his partner that he was 
teaching Peter Singer’s famous work on our moral obligations towards the global poor, and 
noted that, according to Singer, we should all be donating at least 10 percent of our salaries to 
charity.  To which his partner replied, “Well, does he donate that much money to charity?” (As 
it happens: yes.) But now: what is the point behind this (seemingly ad hominem) question?  
                                               
8 Cf. Wallace 2010: 317, who distinguishes between “moral advice” and “moral criticism” (which is, for 
Wallace, blame).  
9 Tognazzini ms.   
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Arguably, it is this.  By saying that we should all be donating 10 percent of our salaries to 
charity, Singer can seem to be blaming those of us who do not do so – but if he doesn’t do so 
himself, then he is in no position to blame.  In other words, just by saying, “We should all be 
donating 10 percent of our money to charity,” this can seem to amount to one’s blaming those 
who do not donate in this way to charity.  Now, this strong implication can be cancelled – but 
the point is that it must be cancelled.  That is, one can say 
 
Look, I don’t do this myself, so I’m not blaming anyone here, but I do think we should 
all be donating at least 10 percent of our salaries to charity.    
 
Here one explicitly cancels what would otherwise be pragmatically implied by one’s assertion of 
the claim that, morally speaking, we should all be donating 10 percent of our salaries to charity, 
viz., that one blames those who fail to do so.  And note that it plainly makes no sense to 
respond to the above with anything like, “Well, you’re in no position to say that that’s what we 
should do – you don’t do this yourself!” The speaker may be in position to say that this is what 
we should do without being in position to blame us if this is not what we do.  So similarly for 
criticism more generally. I may be in position to say that your spring is inadequate relative to 
the standard of working for the job at hand, without being in position to criticize you on 
account of your spring that it is inadequate for the job at hand.   
 Perhaps what is wanted here is some distinction between criticizing a non-agential thing 
in the world and criticizing an agent – in other words, some distinction between criticizing the 
work, and criticizing the workman, or criticizing the painting, and criticizing the painter. As I 
see it, such a distinction can appear in our natural language judgments concerning “criticism” – 
but, as ever, these judgments are delicate.  However, consider first the following, which, 
presumably, everyone agrees is infelicitous: 
 
# (5) I’m saying that your paintings are all bad paintings, but I’m not criticizing your 
paintings. 
 
That, of course, makes no sense. To say my paintings are bad paintings is to criticize my 
paintings.  But what about: 
 
 13 
? (6) I’m saying that your paintings are bad paintings, but I’m not criticizing you.  
 
Now, (6) is certainly a confusing thing to say.  If someone tells me that my paintings are all bad, 
this seems to simply be another way of saying that I am a bad painter – and to say that I am a 
bad painter is, in point of fact, to criticize me, viz., as a bad painter.  As I noted above, one 
typically criticizes the painter by criticizing the paintings; and it is hard to sense a gap between 
the two. However, there is a reading of (6) that arguably does make sense – and this is one in 
which the speaker does not judge that my paintings are a reflection of my deficient capacity to 
paint.  Consider:   
 
(6*) Yeah, his paintings are all bad paintings, but you know why? He was threatened 
that if he ever made a good painting, he’d lose his home.  So all this time he’s been 
deliberately making bad paintings.  So his paintings are all bad, but we have no idea 
whether he’s a bad painter.    
 
Now the point.  In (6*), one is arguably criticizing the paintings, but not the painter.  One can 
do this insofar as one can judge that a certain deficient outcome may be someone’s doing, but 
nevertheless that someone’s doing which is deficient may not be a reflection of their deficient 
capacities to do. What we have, then, is a distinction between “deficiency” (or “falling below a 
standard”) of two different sorts.  Roughly, we have deficiency in paintings (however this is to 
be understood or otherwise measured), and deficiency is capacities to paint.    
 It is worth observing here that, on this score, there is no relevant parallel with the case 
of blame.  In the case of blame, there is no parallel distinction between, say, blaming an action 
and blaming an agent – indeed, it is obvious that any such distinction is hopeless.  After all, we 
do not “blame” actions in the first place.  Instead, we blame agents on account of their actions 
(or perhaps their characters, or their beliefs, or …).  In other words, there is only one possible 
fit object of the attitude of blame, and that is an agent.  However, one can indeed criticize pieces 
of art – and one can also criticize artists.  Again, typically, one criticizes artists by criticizing 
some relevant pieces of art.  But it makes no sense at all to suggest that one blames some art, 
and therefore also some artist – or that one blames an artist by blaming their art.   
 This distinction forces a clarification of the be better norm.  In particular, it forces a 
restriction on what we are allowed to substitute for x. The thought here plainly isn’t that one is 
 14 
in position to criticize a painting only if one is better than … that very painting, or in position 
to criticize a spring only if one is better than … that very spring.  The thought, instead, is that 
one is in position in to criticize a painter with respect to some standard by criticizing a painting 
only if one is better than that painter with respect to that standard.  Thus to clarify:   
 
One must: criticize agent x with respect to standard s only if one is better than 
agent x with respect to standard s. 10   
 
Return then to Edison and the spring.  My suggestion is that Edison can recognize that the 
spring is deficient relative to some standard of working for the job at hand, but that the 
spring’s being deficient in this respect needn’t be evidence of some criticisable deficiency in the 
workman’s capacities.  In other words: Edison can recognize that the workman’s capacities do 
not themselves fall below any relevant standard for workmans’s capacities – but that some 
doing of the workman (even in his capacity as a workman) falls below some other kind of 
standard.  Which is other words for saying what is perhaps more simple to say: Edison can 
recognize that the workman’s spring won’t work, but not be criticizing the workman, because 
Edison needn’t be judging that such a workman is supposed to be able to fashion such springs 
that do work.  However, if Edison is indeed criticizing the workman precisely by criticizing his 
spring, then – with a certain proviso to come – the workman’s reply comes into force: let’s see you 
do better.   
 
Objection 3: Professionals and Amateurs 
 
And now, finally, we come to what is certainly the most difficult challenge for the be better 
norm of criticism.  And this is that the case just considered – even once clarified – can 
nevertheless seem like a simple counterexample to that norm.  After all, suppose Edison 
clarifies that he is criticizing the workman.  And the workman replies, “Well, let’s see you do 
                                               
10 In practice, no one confuses the nature of the norm in the imagined way; anyway, the result of any 
such confusion is, shall we say, startling: 
  
Those apartments are awful – way too tiny and cramped.  # Alright, wise guy, but you’re not so 
big yourself.   
That’s a lousy spring; it’s tensile strength is far weaker than what it needs to be.  # Yeah, well, 
your own tensile strength is not so hot either, tough guy.   
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better.”  Might Edison not simply reply that, well, he is not a workman?  Here we come, then, to 
a serious difficulty for the be better norm.  And so let me make, in advance, the following 
admission.  In order to save the be better norm from these putative counterexamples, some 
serious gymnastics are going to be required.  In particular, we are going to have to be very 
careful about what it is we are criticizing the relevant agents for.  However, my contention is 
that, overall, these gymnastics are neither ad hoc nor unmotivated.   
 But let’s back up.  In addition to the case just mentioned, consider further the 
following: 
 
The gallery.  Suilin is in a fancy art gallery in Copenhagen.  She says, “Gosh, these 
paintings are dreadful. The color scheme is all wrong.” Improbably overhearing her 
from behind a hidden screen, the artist emerges to say, “Well you certainly don’t like 
my paintings, that’s for sure – but let’s see you do better!” 
 
Variant: Improbably, the artist recognizes Suilin as her old acquaintance from 
high school art class, and retorts, “Yeah, well, I’ve seen your own paintings, 
Suilin, and we both know that these are a lot better than anything you could 
do.”  
 
The filmmaker. Roland is a filmmaker whose latest film was just trashed by Jane’s review 
in the Times.  In an outburst, Roland says, “These lazy critics think they’re so damn 
clever – but, you know, they’ve never produced a single worthwhile piece of art in their 
lives; all they can do is just sit around sniping at others.  Hell, I’d like to see any of 
them make a film half as good as the one I just made.  I’ll listen when I see these 
bastards do better themselves.”  
 
The football/soccer fan. Ronaldo, the star player for Juventus, is preparing to take a spot-
kick near the side-line.  Ronaldo kicks the ball far over the goal post, which prompts 
Anders – a 70 year-old Juventus fan – to exclaim, “Come on Ronaldo, keep the damn 
ball down!” Improbably hearing his outburst, Ronaldo calmly walks over to Anders and 
says, “Alright old man, after the game, let’s see you do better.”   
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Variant: Ronaldo’s adoring fan Juan, sitting a row behind Anders, says to him: 
“I bet you couldn’t do any better, old man.”  
 
The kitchen install.  Pavel is a professional tradesperson and kitchen installer, recently 
hired to renovate someone’s kitchen while she is away.  Pavel’s friend Charlie – himself 
a teacher – happens by, and comes in to have a look at Pavel’s progress.  Charlie says, 
“Pavel, I’ve got to say that this isn’t very good. Look, the doors aren’t even on straight – 
and look, the tiles are uneven too.” To which he replies: “Yeah, well Charlie, it is a lot 
better than you could do.”   
 
Now the point.  Why aren’t the above cases simple counterexamples to the be better norm of 
criticism?  Intuitively, in every such case, the relevant invocation of that norm is simply absurd.  
In every such case, it seems, the critic has available a roughly similar – and decisive – reply: 
 
Suilin: “Well, I’m not saying I could do better – but then again, I’m not putting 
forward my art in a professional art gallery.”  
Jane: “Well, I’m not saying that I personally could make a better film – but then again, 
I’m not putting films out there as being of professional level quality.”  
Anders: “Well, I’m not saying I could do (or ever could have done) better – but then 
again, I’m not a professional footballer.”  
Charlie: “Well, I’m not saying that I could do better – but then again, I’m not a 
professional tradesperson.”  
 
The upshot is that we seem to have counterexamples to the be better norm, counterexamples 
that point to a more general lesson. In order to criticize artists, I don’t need to be a better artist 
myself.  In order to criticize filmmakers, I don’t need to be a better filmmaker myself.  In order 
to criticize athletes, I don’t need to be a better athlete myself. In order to criticize tradespeople, 
I don’t have to be able to be a better tradesperson myself.  The norm, it seems, has just given us 
the wrong results.   
 But this is too fast.  My reaction to the above cases is simple.  What we have here are 
not appeals to an illicit norm of criticism.  What we have here are illicit appeals to that norm.  
In other words, what we have here is not a confused norm, but instead confused appeals to that 
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norm.  The way I wish to bring out this point appeals to a move familiar from other areas of 
responsibility-theory.  In particular, we must be very careful to specify what it is that – at a 
deeper level – the above persons are being criticized for.11  That is, we need to specify more 
clearly the nature of the criticism in question, and what we might call the “logical form” of 
“criticism sentences”.  My contention is that once we see what the criticism really is in these 
cases, we’ll see that there is no reason to think that the relevant critics do not in fact satisfy the 
be better norm of criticism – and it is this that explains the oddness of the above replies to the 
given critics.   
I begin with the following important observation: no analogue of the replies just 
considered is available to our critics in our first set of cases. In response to Rebecca’s challenge, 
for instance, Ross can’t say, “Well, sure, I can’t do any better, but I’m not saying I could – I’m 
not any kind of professional plasterer.”  That’s of course right. But then again, neither is 
Rebecca. The simple observation here is that, in the first set of cases, the critic and the 
criticized are both “amateurs” who are, in some important way, subject to the same 
expectations.  Now, when we move to amateur-on-professional cases, something important seems 
to have changed, and the response (“let’s see you do better”) seems to misfire.  Now, there are 
two competing diagnoses of this change we might consider.  The first is that, when we move to 
amateur-on-professional cases, the be better norm no longer applies.  This is equivalent to saying 
that the be better norm is not a norm on criticism per se, but is instead a norm on merely on 
what we might call peer-criticism, where two people are “peers” with respect to a standard just in 
case both such persons are expected, in the relevant way, to live up to that standard.  Thus:  
 
Be better than peers: 
 
One must: criticize some peer x with respect to standard s only if one is better than x 
with respect to s.   
 
                                               
11 Cf. debates about the status of the so-called “Frankfurt-style” counterexamples to the principle of 
alternative possibilities (PAP).  Some defenders of the principle have responded to the cases roughly as 
follows: once we pay careful attention to what the relevant agent is responsible for in these cases (e.g., as 
in van Inwagen, some “consequence-particular” rather than a “consequence-universal”) , we’ll see that 
the relevant agents were in fact free to avoid responsibility for that very thing.  Needless to say, I take no 
position here on PAP and the Frankfurt cases; this is just a comparison.   
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But whereas I endorse be better than peers, this is because, ultimately, I endorse the more general 
principle, be better.  And so let us consider a second diagnosis of this change.  The second 
diagnosis maintains that, when we move to amateur-professional cases, it isn’t that the be better 
norm no longer applies.  Rather, it is that the criticism at issue subtly changes as well, and thus 
subtly does meet that norm (at least when appropriate).  In other words, we have two 
competing explanations of the mistake the professionals are making in the second set of cases: 
(a) the professionals in the above cases are illicitly appealing to a norm that doesn’t apply in the 
relevant context (they are appealing to a norm like be better than peers – but the critic and the 
criticized aren’t peers), or (b) the professionals in the above cases are illicitly misconstruing, by 
implicitly levelling-down, what it is that they are being criticized for.  Option (b) would preserve 
the simple norm of criticism: be better.  I favour option (b).  
 Let us begin by considering Charlie’s criticism of Pavel.  And let us distinguish between 
what we might call the surface criticisms in this case, and the real criticism.  The surface 
criticisms: these doors aren’t straight; these tiles look bad; this isn’t looking very good.  The real 
criticism: you are trying to pass off work of non-professional quality as work of professional quality.  But 
now the point.  The problem with Pavel’s reply – that Charlie is no better at installing kitchens 
than he is – is thus that Pavel has responded merely to the surface criticisms to which he has 
been subjected, but is not responding to the real criticism. Perhaps Charlie couldn’t tile any 
better.  That may be, and had Charlie said, “Pavel, this is bad even for an amateur,” that may 
be relevant.  But the real criticism is that he’s represented himself as a professional but now 
isn’t delivering work commensurate with being a professional.  And it is thus absurd for Pavel 
to attempt to say that Charlie is no better at installing kitchens than he is.  That just 
misunderstands the criticism. In other words, with respect to the real criticism, there is no 
reason to suppose that Charlie is no better than Pavel; there is no reason to think that Charlie 
also represents himself as a professional and then doesn’t deliver professional quality work.  
 One way to see that what I have called the surface criticisms are indeed merely surface 
criticisms is to simply observe that Charlie’s reaction to the very same job would be very different, 
if he thought, say, that the job was a first-time “practice run” of Pavel’s young upstart 
apprentice; indeed, in that case, Charlie might have found himself saying, “Hey, wow, these 
tiles look pretty good!”  What this seems to show is that, when Charlie initially uttered, “Pavel, 
these tiles look bad,” what he meant was something like, “Pavel, these tiles look bad for a 
professional job,” – which, if it is to be a criticism of Pavel, is other words for saying, “Pavel, 
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you’re passing off work that isn’t up to professional standards as being of professional 
standards.”  (If Pavel isn’t a professional, or he is a professional but, for some strange reason, 
the job he is doing is not meant to be a professional job, then the fact that the tiles aren’t good 
for a professional job is of course no criticism of Pavel.) Thus again: that is the real criticism of 
Pavel.   
Now consider the filmmaker.  There is something pathetic about the unfortunately 
common phenomena of a filmmaker who reacts to negative reviews by saying that he’d like to 
see the film critics themselves do better, even if such a filmmaker is right – as such filmmakers 
tend to emphasize – that it is much easier to criticize films than to make them.  But we have, 
again, two possible explanations of what is pathetic about this reaction.  The first is that this 
amounts to a pathetic appeal to what is in itself a pathetic norm – the norm that, in order to 
criticize, you have to be better yourself.  The second explanation, however, is the one I favour.  
What is pathetic here is precisely the filmmaker’s idea that this norm will protect him from 
criticism if he makes a bad film.  We have a pathetic attempt to hide behind a norm that is in 
itself perfectly good – or a pathetic attempt to act as if a norm condemns a piece of criticism 
which it simply doesn’t condemn.     
 Look at it this way.  To make a film and submit it publicly for the world to see is to take 
a risk.  But if, when criticized, a filmmaker says, “Alright, you critics – let’s see you make a better 
film,” the filmmaker is thus revealed to be someone who wants it both ways.  If his film is 
received well, then he expects to receive all of the accolades that accrue to someone who makes 
great films.  But if it is received badly, then he expects to be able to implicate that he is just 
some sort amateur who never meant to suggest that his work is especially worthy of esteem. In 
other words, he expects to say: since this was just the product of an idle amateur, it must be 
judged as the work of an amateur – so if you think that what I’ve done is bad even for an amateur, 
then, since you too are amateur, let’s see you do better. But this is pathetic.  If you put your work 
forward as being at the level of a professional, you can’t then retreat to the safety of the claim 
that it is good for an amateur.  Maybe it is.  But we weren’t criticizing your film as being bad 
for an amateur (in point of fact, it may be astoundingly good for an amateur – and if we 
thought this were a submission for the college film competition, we might be seriously 
impressed).  We’re criticizing it as being bad for a professional – and thus, at the deeper level, 
we are criticizing you for seeing fit to suggest it as being good for a professional.  That is our 
criticism of you.  If you say to that, “Let’s see you do better,” then we have a ready reply: we at 
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least wouldn’t put forward material like this as of professional-level quality.  In other words, 
once we are clear about the nature of the criticism, we can observe that our criticism does in fact 
meet the be better norm.  And we can see that “Let’s see you do better” is a pathetic attempt to 
reconstrue our criticism as something it wasn’t.   
Once clarified in this way, the “Let’s see you do better” retort is out of place, in the 
above cases, not because be better is a mistaken norm, but because there is no reason to think 
that the real criticisms at issue fail to meet that norm.  A helpful way to bring out this point is 
to observe how the “Let’s see you …” reply is pre-emptively blocked if the critic specifies his or her 
implicit criticism more concretely.  Consider:   
 
Suilin: Sheesh, these paintings are really bad – I wouldn’t try to pass these off as worth 
displaying in a fancy gallery!   
 
# Artist: Well, let’s see you do better.  
 
The artist’s retort now makes no sense; is the artist alleging that Suilin indeed would pass off 
such paintings as worth displaying in such a gallery?  But that, presumably, is something for 
which (ordinarily) the artist would have no relevant evidence.  Of course, the artist may be 
reasonably confident that, however “bad” her paintings are, it is unlikely that some apparent 
tourist can do better. Thus, in principle, she is in position to challenge a tourist on that score.  
But that is not the score on which she has been challenged.  Her retort thus verges on the 
incoherent.    
 Similarly, consider:  
 
Charlie: Sheesh, Pavel, this kitchen is looking pretty bad – I wouldn’t try to pass off this 
kind of work as professional installation.   
 
# Pavel: Well, let’s see you install a kitchen that looks better.   
 
Again, Pavel’s retort now plainly makes no sense; Pavel has simply ignored Charlie’s criticism, 
and responded to some other imagined criticism – namely, “Pavel, this isn’t even good for an 
amateur.” If Charlie says that his job is so bad that it isn’t even good for an amateur, then 
 21 
indeed Pavel’s reply makes sense (or at least doesn’t so clearly not make sense): “OK, if this isn’t 
decent for an amateur – well, you’re an amateur, so let’s see you do better then.”  
The intuition now is not that the “Let’s see you…” reply is absurd, in the above cases, 
because, really, the critic needn’t be able to do better (and the be better norm is false); the 
intuition is instead that that reply is absurd because, once the nature of the criticism is clarified 
in this way, there is clearly now no reason to think that the critic does not meet this norm.  In 
other words, there is no reason to think that Suilin indeed would pass off this kind of art as 
worth displaying in a gallery, or that Charlie indeed would try to pass off this sort of work as 
worthy of a professional tradesperson.  Once we distinguish between the mere surface criticism 
and the real criticism, the be better norm emerges perfectly intact.  Admittedly, it is a bit 
difficult to know how to argue that the “real” form of (say) Charlie’s criticism is as I have 
indicated. The lesson, however, is this.  There is a very natural way of construing Charlie’s 
criticism – and all of the relevant criticisms above – as ones which do in fact meet the be better 
norm.  I don’t have much in the way of argument for my own theory of these criticisms beyond 
that, well, it saves the be better norm – or, less controversially, perhaps  -- it provides us with an 
elegant way of seeing how all agential criticism is subject to one and the same norm of 
criticism, and how the latter set of cases is, at a deeper level, perfectly continuous with the first 
set of cases, cases in which the invocation of a be better norm seems to be perfectly in order.    
But let us finally consider the sports case – the case of Anders (the old fan) criticizing 
Ronaldo.  Here I confess to being pulled in different directions.  Let me explain.  We must 
distinguish between mere outbursts and criticisms.  Now, mere outbursts are presumably subject 
to various norms, but the thesis of this paper is not that outbursts per se are subject to the be 
better norm.  The thesis is that criticism is subject to that norm.  To bring out the difference, or 
at least one in the vicinity, consider:  
 
The stairs. Danny trips on the stairs, prompting spontaneous howls of laughter from his 
good pal Alice.  Danny says, “Oh, shut up Alice – I saw you fall over these steps just last 
week.” Alice retorts, still smirking, “Mate, I’m not criticizing you – I’m having a laugh 
at you.”  
 
The point: there are attitudes nearby criticism that can be mistaken for criticism.  If Alice’s 
laughter is implicit criticism, Danny’s reply is appropriate.  He can rightly say that Alice is no 
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better with respect to not tripping on stairs, so is in no position to criticize.  But Alice can be in 
position to laugh at Danny, without being in position to criticize Danny.    
My sense is that, in many “sports” cases, the relevant fan reactions are something more 
akin to outbursts, or spontaneous expressions of feelings of disappointment or frustration that 
The Team is losing (or something similar). (“Oh no!  She dropped it! Come on!”) But it can be 
unclear when the expression of those feelings amounts to criticism.  The fact is, someone can 
be upset to the point of tears – or throwing something at the television – that Jones didn’t 
make that catch, but not be criticizing Jones for not making that catch.   
Return, then, to Anders.  My claim is that what we have here is a mere outburst, then 
that outburst is not subject to the be better norm.  But let’s suppose that Anders really is 
criticizing Ronaldo.  My contention is that, if Anders really is criticizing Ronaldo in this case, 
Anders implicitly does represent himself thusly: Well, if I were a professional footballer, I at least 
wouldn’t knock the ball that far over the goalpost in this kind of circumstance; I’d have the composure to 
keep cool, and aim the ball properly, at least giving us a chance at success.  But the status of this 
conjecture is exactly that: it is sheer conjecture.  And this, in part, explains my ambivalence 
about the status of criticism like that of Anders’. Anders is criticizing Ronaldo’s kick, but, 
really, we have little idea whether Anders (or most anyone else for that matter) would in fact 
have the composure needed in those circumstances.  I can – perhaps – know with some 
reasonable degree of certainty that I wouldn’t try to pass of a certain film as being of great 
quality; I doubt I can know with any certainty at all that I’d keep my composure under the gaze 
of hundreds of thousands of overzealous fans.   
Look at it this way.  If Anders is criticizing at all here, then Anders is really criticizing 
Ronaldo’s mental composure.  He’s disappointed that, in the heat of the moment, Ronaldo 
allowed himself to get carried away, trying to be the hero and score some miracle-goal, rather 
than doing the less “heroic” thing that would in fact give his team its best chance of success.  
And Anders may in fact be the sort of person who wouldn’t do that sort of thing.  If so, then 
his criticism was appropriate; if not, not.12  But once more, we can explain the feeling that 
                                               
12  With respect to the topics of this paper, there are cases, and then there are cases, and then there are 
some cases.  Needless to say, I can’t consider every case that might possibly be relevant here, but I hope 
I’ve considered enough (and varied) cases so that we needn’t rely on any one single judgment that may 
be hopelessly idiosyncratic.  But I do want to mention one further: 
 
The coach.  Serena is a professional tennis player with the stated goal of being best in the world.  
Her coach, Oracene, now 70, is making her drill her backhand, and is relentlessly barking 
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there is something amiss with Ronaldo’s reply, and we can do so as follows.  Insofar as he is 
being criticized at all here, it is on grounds of his mental composure.  Thus, to retort “Let’s see 
you do better, old man,” is to miss the point.  Ronaldo can be sure that the old man could not 
do any better with respect to a surface criticism – that kick wasn’t on target – but it is at best 
unclear whether the old man could do better with respect to the real criticism – that one must 
stay composed in the heat of the moment.   
 
Grounding the non-hypocrisy norm on blame  
 
So ends my defense of the be better norm of criticism.  I turn now to our final issue: what is the 
relationship between this norm of criticism and the non-hypocrisy norm on the standing to 
blame?  At some level, my story here can be as brief as it is simple.  The relationship between 
these two things is that the latter is simply a more specific instance of the former.  There is a be 
better norm on criticism; to blame is to criticize; thus, one must blame a certain agent with 
respect to some standard only if one is better than that agent with respect to that standard.  
And that is other words for saying: if you are no better at meeting a certain standard as the 
person to be blamed, then you are in no position to blame.  Thus, the non-hypocrisy condition 
                                               
corrections: “Feet planted!”, “Good, but now you’ve overcorrected – one more time!” And on it 
goes. But Oracene knows what she is doing, and knows exactly how and when to push Serena. 
Serena ultimately breaks down in frustration, and explains, “Alright Oracene, let’s see you do a 
proper backhand then!”   
   
There is plainly something illicit about the particular form of Serena’s frustration in this case – 
obviously, Oracene, now 70, is not going to be able to demonstrate the precise thing she wishes to see 
in Serena – but the diagnosis here is delicate.  The problem is that, plausibly, by making Oracene her 
coach, Serena has authorized Oracene to criticize her, irrespective of Oracene’s standing to criticize her.  
(Or: depending on how on conceptualizes “standing”, Serena gives Oracene standing to criticize her.) 
What is strange about Serena’s retort, in these circumstances, is that she is implicitly reneging on her 
commitment to Oracene as her coach, and has instead lapsed into a posture in which she treats her as a 
mere fellow player.  At any rate, the player-coach relationship at issue in this case raises difficulties, not 
all of which I have space to address; I thus set this case aside.  For more on “authority” and its 
relationship to “standing”, see Herstein 2017 and 2020, Tognazzini (ms), and Piovarchy forthcoming b.    
 It is worth noting, however, that one could attempt to diagnose all of the 
“amateur/professional” cases at issue in this paper in a similar manner.  In particular, one could 
attempt to say that professionals – just in virtue of becoming professionals – authorize us non-
professionals to criticize them, irrespective of our standing to criticize them.  (Thanks to [withheld] for 
this interesting suggestion.)  A full evaluation of this diagnosis, however, must lay beyond the scope of 
this paper.   
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on standing to blame follows immediately from the be better norm of criticism.  We thus have a 
defense of what I above called Option (4).   
The realization that one can derive the non-hypocrisy condition from more general 
norms on criticism puts pressure on certain conceptions of “moral standing” present in the  
literature.  For instance, consider the following.  Todd has given what we might call a moral 
commitment account of moral standing: “one has moral standing to blame a given wrongdoer if 
and only if one is morally committed to the values that condemn the wrongdoer’s actions”, 
where “moral commitment”, according to Todd, consists, minimally, in “endorsement of the 
relevant value as a value, and at least some degree of motivation” to comply with it.  (2019: 
357) But suppose that, in response to Lucy’s challenge, Dan tries to draw a dragon and does no 
better than Lucy.  Intuitively, his criticism no longer “stands”, and now he must withdraw it.  
But the problem, then, for Dan’s criticism of Lucy’s dragon was not anything like that Dan’s 
failure to draw a good dragon reveals Dan to be insufficiently committed to the value – say – of 
drawing good dragons.  Dan’s commitment to excellent-dragon-drawing is neither here nor 
there.  What is relevant is simply that Dan is no better than Lucy with respect to meeting the 
standard in question.  In general, what seems to matter here is not one’s abstract 
“commitment” to a given norm, but one’s concrete ability to comply with it.    
 The “gap” between the be better norm of criticism and Todd’s “moral commitment” 
account of the moral standing to blame is either a problem for the former, or for the latter, or, 
perhaps, both.  In the spirit of reconciliation, however, I want to conclude by suggesting a way 
of bridging this gap – that is, of explaining why Todd’s moral commitment account of the 
standing to blame is at least prima facie plausible, but can also plausibly be derived from a be 
better norm of criticism.  The suggestion is the following.  Note that, in the first set of cases, 
there is a certain kind of gap between the agent’s motivation or desire to perform the task in 
question, and the agent’s actually performing the task in question.  When it comes to drawing a 
“good” dragon, or not striking out, or keeping orchids alive, or getting a paper published, or 
evening out plaster, there may be a substantial gap between one’s motivation and desire to do 
these things, and one’s actually doing them.  Intuitively, one could be fully committed to keeping 
the orchids alive, and yet, due to insufficient gardening know-how, not be able to keep them 
alive.  One could be fully committed to hitting well in baseball, and yet, due to insufficient 
physical skill, not be able to hit well in baseball.    
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 But is morality like this?  The question is a difficult question, of course – but there is at 
the very least a strong case that it isn’t.  Succeeding in morality – unlike succeeding in 
gardening – does not demand of an agent more than what is in that very agent’s control.  More 
to the point: if meeting a certain standard is beyond the capacity of a certain agent, then that 
agent’s meeting that standard is not a moral requirement.  Thus, when it comes to morality, the 
relevant “gap” observed in the first set of cases seems to disappear.  Intuitively, the fact that 
Jane’s orchids have died certainly doesn’t show, by itself, that Jane isn’t committed to keeping 
her orchids alive.  However, the fact that Jane lies to me does indeed tend to show that she isn’t 
committed to the value of not lying to me.  She could be fully committed to keeping orchids 
alive, and yet not keep them alive – but she couldn’t really be fully committed to not lying to 
me, and yet lie to me.  If she were fully committed to not lying to me, well, she wouldn’t.  
That’s because not lying is a mere moral requirement, and meeting that requirement is open to 
any agent that is in fact committed to meeting that requirement.  But it is simply false that, if 
only she were fully committed to keeping the orchids alive, she would.   
 I can sum up as follows.  Todd’s “moral commitment” account of the moral standing to 
blame will be extensionally equivalent with a be better norm of criticism, so long as we maintain 
that genuine commitment to a moral standard (or value) entails actually complying with that 
standard (or value).  Said differently: if we maintain that non-compliance with a norm entails 
non-commitment to that norm, then the “moral commitment” account of standing ends up 
converging upon a be better norm of criticism.  Thus, the plausibility of the moral commitment 
account of moral standing is in fact no difficulty for the be better norm, and vice versa: that 
there is a deeper, more fundamental be better norm is no problem for the extensional adequacy of 
a moral commitment account of the moral standing to blame.   
   
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have defended a be better norm of criticism – a underexplored norm that is 
nevertheless ubiquitous in our lives, once we begin looking for it.  The be better norm is, I hope 
to have shown, continuously invoked in a wide range of ordinary settings, can undergird and 
explain the widely endorsed non-hypocrisy condition on the standing to blame, and can be 
defended – so I say – from all of the most obvious objections it faces.  However, if you think 
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that I have made a mess of the issues discussed above, then I have one simple response.  And 
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